Einsatzgruppen
Nazi Germany Occupied Europe |headquarters = RSHA, Prinz-Albrecht-Straße, Berlin |latd=52 |latm=30 |lats=26 |latNS=N |longd=13 |longm= 22|longs=57 |longEW= E |region_code = |employees = ~ 3,000 c. 1941 |budget = |minister1_name = Heinrich Himmler |minister1_pfo = Reichsführer |minister2_name = |minister2_pfo = |chief1_name = SS-Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich |chief1_position = Director, RSHA (1939–1942) |chief2_name =SS-Obergruppenführer Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner |chief2_position = Director, RSHA, (1943–1945) |agency_type = |parent_agency = Allgemeine SS RSHA |child1_agency = |child2_agency = |child3_agency = |website = |footnotes = }} Einsatzgruppen ( ;LEO Deutsch-Englisches Wörterbuch "einsatzgruppe", "deployment groups"''Encyclopaedia Britannica's reflections on the holocaust "The Einsatzgruppen" http://www.britannica.com/holocaust/article-215489 singular ''Einsatzgruppe; official full name Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD) were SS paramilitary death squads that were responsible for mass killings, typically by shooting. The units targeted Jews in particular, but also significant numbers of other population groups and political categories; including Gypsies, and Soviet political commissars. The Einsatzgruppen operated throughout the territory occupied by the German armed forces following the German invasions of Poland, in September 1939, and later, of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The Einsatzgruppen carried out operations ranging from the murder of a few people to operations which lasted over two or more days, such as the massacres at Babi Yar (33,771 killed in two days) and Rumbula (25,000 killed in two days). The Einsatzgruppen were responsible for the murders of over 1,000,000 people, and they were the first Nazi organizations to commence mass killing of Jews as an organized policy. Background The Einsatzgruppen were formed under the direction of SS-Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich (deputy to Heinrich Himmler) and operated by the Schutzstaffel (SS) before and during World War II.[http://www.holocaust-history.org/intro-einsatz/ Holocaust History Project, Introduction to the Einsatzgruppen] From September 1939 forward the SS-Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA – Reich Main Security Office) had overall command of the Einsatzgruppen. Their principal task during the war (according to SS General Erich von dem Bach at the Nuremberg Trials) "... was the annihilation of the Jews, Gypsies, and Soviet political commissars".The Trial of German Major War Criminals. Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany. 7th January to 19th January 1946. Twenty-Eighth Day (Part 6 of 10) (nizkor) The Einsatzgruppen had a leading role in the implementation of the final solution of the Jewish question (Die Endlösung der Judenfrage) in the conquered territories. Personnel Each Einsatzgruppe was led by SD, Gestapo and Kripo officers, and its members included recruits from the Orpo, the Waffen-SS, and local volunteers, such as militia groups. Each death squad followed the Wehrmacht Heer (German Army) as it advanced eastwards through Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.Nuremberg Military Tribunal, Einsatzgruppen trial, judgment, pages 414 – 416 During the course of their operations, the Einsatzgruppen commanders were authorized to request, and did receive, assistance from the Wehrmacht. Heydrich acted under orders from Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler who supplied security forces on an "as needed" basis to the local SS and Police Leaders. In occupied territory, the Einsatzgruppen also used the local populace for additional security and personnel (see below). For example, incorporated specifically into Einsatzgruppe D were a number of Albanian, Serbo-Croatian and possibly Bosnian volunteers, who were organized by Mohammad Amin al-Husayni, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. According to their own records, the Einsatzgruppen murdered more than one million people, almost all civilians, beginning with the Polish intelligentsia, and swiftly progressed to killing Jews, Gypsies and others throughout Eastern Europe. Historian Raul Hilberg estimates that between 1941 and 1945 the Einsatzgruppen and the SS killed more than 1.3 million Jews, Gypsies, and Soviet political commissars in open-air shootings.Headland 1992 History The Einsatzgruppen has its origins in the ad-hoc Einsatzkommando, formed by Reinhard Heydrich to secure government buildings and documents following the Anschluss in Austria in March 1938.Streim 1989, page 436. This task was the Einsatzgruppen's original mandate: to secure government buildings with their accompanying documentation, and question senior civil servants in lands occupied by Germany. Czechoslovakia The Einsatzgruppen were founded in the summer of 1938, when Germany was preparing an invasion of Czechoslovakia, scheduled for October 1. The Einsatzgruppen were to travel in the wake of the German armies as they advanced into Czechoslovakia, and secure government papers and offices. Unlike the early Einsatzkommando, the Einsatzgruppen were to be armed and authorized to freely use lethal force to accomplish their mission. The Munich Agreement of 1938 prevented the war for which the Einsatzgruppen were originally founded, but as the Germans occupied the Sudetenland in the fall of 1938, the Einsatzgruppen moved into the region to occupy offices formerly belonging to the Czechoslovak state. After the occupation of the rest of the Czech portion of Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939, the Einsatzgruppen were re-formed and again used to secure offices formerly belonging to the Czechoslovak government. The Einsatzgruppen were never a standing formation; rather they were ad hoc units recruited mostly from the ranks of the SS, the SD, and various German police forces such as the Ordnungspolizei, the Gendarmerie, the Kripo and the Gestapo, though generally the same personnel were recruited again when a unit was re-activated. Once the overall military campaign ended, however, the Einsatzgruppen units were disbanded. Poland , October 1939]] , 20.10.1939]] In response to Hitler's plans to invade Poland, Heydrich re-formed the Einsatzgruppen to travel in the wake of the German armies. Heydrich gave the Einsatzgruppen commanders carte blanche to kill anyone belonging to groups that the Germans considered hostile. After the occupation of Poland in 1939, the Einsatzgruppen killed Poles belonging to the upper class and intelligentsia, such as priests and teachers.Browning, Origins of the Final Solution, at pages 16–18. The mission of the Einsatzgruppen was therefore the forceful depoliticization of the Polish people and the elimination of the groups most clearly identified with the Polish national identity. As stated by Hitler in his Armenian quote, units were sent: "...with orders for them to send to death mercilessly and without compassion, men, women, and children of Polish race and language. Only in this way can we obtain the living space we need."Norman Davies, God's Playground: A History of Poland, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, 2: 263. "Whatever we find in the shape of an upper class in Poland will be liquidated," Hitler had declared.[http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/holocaust/h-tasks.htm Tasks of Einsatzgruppen in Poland] The massacres committed in Poland in 1939 caused tension with the German Army, who, while having no moral objections to the massacres of Poles, felt these killings were injurious to military discipline.Rhodes 2002, page 9 The first elimination of Polish intelligentsia took place soon after the German invasion of Poland, and lasted from the fall of 1939 until the spring of 1940. The Intelligenzaktion was a plan to eliminate the Polish intelligentsia, Poland's leadership class, realized by Einsatzgruppen and Volksdeutscher Selbstschutz. They used the Sonderfahndungsbuch Polen, a list of targets prepared before war. Sixty thousand Polish nobles, teachers, Polish entrepreneurs, social workers, priests, judges and political activists were killed in ten regional actions.*Maria Wardzyńska "Był rok 1939 Operacja niemieckiej policji bezpieczeństwa w Polsce. Intelligenzaktion" IPN Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2009 ISBN 978-83-7629-063-8 Meier, Anna "Die Intelligenzaktion: Die Vernichtung Der Polnischen Oberschicht Im Gau Danzig-Westpreusen" (The Intelligentsia Action: The Annihilation of the Polish Upper Class in the Danzig-West Prussian Gau)VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, ISBN 3-639-04721-4 ISBN 978-3-639-04721-9 The Intelligenzaktion was continued by the German AB-Aktion operation in Poland. During Operation Tannenberg eight Einsatzgruppen operated in PolandRichard Rhodes, "Masters of Death: The SS-Einsatzgruppen and the Invention of the Holocaust", Bellona 2008Bohler Jochen, Matthaus Jurgen, Mallmann Klaus-Michael , Einsatzgruppen in Polen", Wissenschaftl. Buchgesell 2008: * Einsatzgruppe I, commanded by SS-Standartenführer Bruno Streckenbach, acted with 14th Army * Einsatzgruppe II, SS-Obersturmbannführer Emanuel Schäfer, acted with 10th Army * Einsatzgruppe III, SS-Obersturmbannführer und Regierungsrat Dr. Hans Fischer, acted with 8th Army * Einsatzgruppe IV, SS-Brigadeführer Lothar Beutel, acted with 4th Army * Einsatzgruppe V, SS-Standartenfürer Ernst Damzog, acted with 3rd Army * Einsatzgruppe VI, SS-Oberführer Erich Naumann, acted on Wielkopolska area * Einsatzgruppe V, SS-Obergruppenführer Udo von Woyrsch and SS-Oberfürer Otto Rasch, acted on Upper Silesia and Cieszyn Silesia * Einsatzkommando 16, SS-Sturmbannführer Dr. Rudolf Tröger, acted on Pomerania Western Europe Following the German invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium and France in May 1940, the Einsatzgruppen once again travelled in the wake of the Wehrmacht, but unlike their operations in Poland, Einsatzgruppen operations in Western Europe in 1940 were within the original mandate of securing government offices and papers. Had Operation Sea Lion, the German plan for an invasion of the United Kingdom, been launched, six Einsatzgruppen were scheduled to follow the invasion force to Britain. The Einsatzgruppen intended for "Sealion" were provided with a list (known as The Black Book after the war) of 2,820 people to be arrested immediately. Soviet Union Hitler approved the re-establishment of the Einsatzgruppen in the lead-up to Operation Barbarossa, the plan to invade the Soviet Union. His orders were sent out sometime between late June 1940, when planning for Operation Barbarossa first started, and May 1941; the surviving historical record does not permit firm conclusions to be drawn about the precise date.Hillgruber 1989, p 94. On March 13, 1941 Hitler dictated sub-paragraph B of the "Guidelines in Special Spheres re Directive No. 21 (Operation Barbarossa)", which read: Sub-paragraph B was intended by Hitler to prevent the sort of friction that had occurred in Poland in 1939 when several German Army generals had attempted to bring Einsatzgruppen leaders to trial for the murders they had committed.Hillgruber 1989, p 95. On March 30, 1941 in a secret speech to his leading generals, Hitler described the sort of war he envisioned against the Soviet Union. Notes taken at the meeting by the Army's Chief of Staff, General Franz Halder, describe: Though General Halder's notes did not record any mention of Jews, the German historian Andreas Hillgruber argued that because of Hitler's frequent contemporary statements about the coming war of annihilation against "Judeo-Bolshevism", his generals would have understood Hitler's call for the destruction of the Soviet Union as also comprising a call for the destruction of the Jewish population therein.Hillgruber 1989, pp 95–96. In May 1941 Reinhard Heydrich passed on verbally the order to kill the Soviet Jews to the Border Police School of Pretzsch when the commanders of the Einsatzgruppen were being trained for Operation Barbarossa.Hillgruber 1989, pp 94–95. In spring 1941, Heydrich and the First Quartermaster of the German Army, General Eduard Wagner successfully completed negotiations for co-operation between the Einsatzgruppen and the German Army to allow the implementation of the "special tasks".Hillgruber 1989, pp 94–96. Following the Heydrich-Wagner agreement on April 28, 1941, Fieldmarshal Walther von Brauchitsch ordered that when Operation Barbarossa began, all German Army commanders were to identify and register at once all Jews in occupied areas in the Soviet Union, and fully co-operate with the Einsatzgruppen.Hillgruber 1989, p 96. For Operation Barbarossa, four Einsatzgruppen were created, each numbering 500–990 men to comprise a total force of 3,000. These Einsatzgruppen were under the control of the RSHA; i.e., Reinhard Heydrich and later his successor Ernst Kaltenbrunner. Heydrich gave them a mandate to secure the offices and papers of the Soviet state and Communist Party; to liquidate all of the higher cadres of the Soviet state; and to instigate and encourage pogroms against all local Jewish populations. The men of the four Einsatzgruppen came from the SD, Gestapo, Kripo, Orpo, and Waffen SS. Each Einsatzgruppen in its area of operations was under the operational control of the Higher SS-Police Chiefs. In a further agreement between the army and the SS concluded in May 1941 by General Wagner and Walter Schellenberg, it was agreed that the Einsatzgruppen in front-line areas were to operate under army command while the army provided the Einsatzgruppen with all necessary logistical support.Rhodes 2002, p 15. , Ukrainian SSR, Soviet Union, in 1942. The photograph is inscribed: "The last Jew in Vinnitsa."]] Before Operation Barbarossa began, the men of the German Army and the SS were told it was a “preventive war” forced on Germany by an alleged Soviet attack planned for July 1941. At the same time, a massive propaganda campaign was launched in spring 1941 presenting Barbarossa as an ideological-racial war between German National Socialism and Soviet Communism, or (to use the preferred German phrase) Judeo-Bolshevism.Förster 2004, p 126. (Later, the Einsatzgruppen would produce much anti-Semitic propaganda depicting the whole Soviet regime as a tool of the Jews.)Marrus 2000, p 100. After the invasion of the USSR on June 22, 1941, the Einsatzgruppen's main assignment was to kill civilians, as in Poland, but this time its targets specifically included Soviet Communist Party commissars and Jews.Rees 1997, p 177. Heydrich drafted new orders on July 2, 1941 stating that the Einsatzgruppen were to execute all Soviet officials of medium rank and above; members of the Comintern; "extremist" Communist Party members; members of the central, provincial and district committees of the Communist Party; Red Army political commissars; and all Communist Party members of Jewish origin. In regards to Jewish populations in general: As the German invasion began, a vast series of bloody pogroms broke out, some of which were encouraged by the Germans, and all of which were the spontaneous outbreaks of local anti-Semitism.Haberer 2001, pp 66–68. Within the first few weeks of Operation Barbarossa, 40 pogroms had broken out with about 10,000 Jews killed by local people.Haberer 2001, p 68. The Canadian historian Erich Haberer has written that incidents such as the Jedwabne pogrom were not incidental, but rather "integral" to the Holocaust in Eastern Europe, as without local help, the Germans could not have murdered so many so quickly.Haberer 2001, p 66. Upon entering Kaunas, Lithuania on June 25, 1941, the Einsatzgruppen released all of the criminals from the local jail and encouraged them to join the pogrom that were underway.Rhodes 2002, pp 40–41. Between June 23–27, 1941, 4,000 Jews were killed on the streets of Kaunas by local people, and saw the first massacres of Jews in open pits committed by Lithuanian anti-Semites.Haberer 2001, pp 67–68. Particularly active in the Kaunas pogrom was the so-called "Death Dealer of Kaunas", a young man who murdered Jews with a crow bar at the Lietukis Garage before a large crowd that cheered each killing with much applause; he occasionally stopped to play the Lithuanian national anthem "Tautiška giesmė" with his accordion before resuming the killingsRees 1997 p 179. One German soldier described the scene: On July 17, 1941 Heydrich ordered that the Einsatzgruppen were to kill all Jewish Red Army POWs, plus all Red Army POWs from Georgia and Central Asia, as Heydrich viewed them as being possibly Jewish.Hillgruber 1989, p 97. After World War II, in an attempt to reduce their own responsibility, several Einsatzgruppen leaders who were brought to trial falsely claimed to have received an order before Operation Barbarossa requiring them to murder all Soviet Jews. There is no evidence to support these assertions; Hedyrich's order to the Einsatzgruppen leaders of June 29, 1941 was to "silently" encourage pogroms, and on July 2, 1941 he ordered the murder only of Jews who were Communist Party members or who held positions in the Soviet government.Streim 1989, pp 440–441. The German prosecutor Alfred Streim noted the legal implications of this distinction: if an order had been given before Operation Barbarossa for the murder of the entire Jewish population of the Soviet Union, post-war courts would had convicted the Einsatzgruppen leaders only as accomplices to mass murder.Streim 1989, p 439. However, if it could be established that the Einsatzgruppen had committed mass murder without orders, then the Einsatzgruppen leaders would have been convicted as perpetrators of mass murder (in the legal sense), and would hence have received stiffer sentences.Streim 1989. p 439. In many cases, the difference between being an accomplice to genocide and a perpetrator could be the difference between life imprisonment and capital punishment. The Einsatzgruppen leaders on trial claimed during the late 1940s to have been given a written "Führer Order" for the murder of the entire Soviet Jewish population several weeks before Operation Barbarossa from Bruno Streckenbach who was widely believed to be dead.Streim 1989, p 440. In fact, Streckenbach was a POW in the Soviet Union, and upon his release in 1955, several imprisoned Einsatzgruppen leaders wrote to him asking him to go along with their lie in order to improve their chances of parole. In response, Streckenbach privately denied ever giving such an order, but in order to assist the imprisoned Einsatzgruppen leaders, remained silent in public on the question of whether he had given the order or not, neither confirming nor denying the claim he had passed along a general order for genocide (thereby giving the impression he had without saying so). The British historian Sir Ian Kershaw wrote that it has been firmly established that the claim that a "Führer Order" for the general genocide before Operation Barbarossa was a post-war fabrication invented by men on trial for their lives, and thus had more to do with their defence than the facts of the matter.Kershaw 2008, p 258. Kershaw had argued that it was likely that Hitler's apocalyptic remarks before Barbarossa about the necessity for a war without mercy to “annihilate" the forces of “Judeo-Bolshevism” were taken as both permission and encouragement by the Einsatzgruppen commanders to engage in extreme anti-Semitic violence with discretion being given to each Einsatzgruppen commander about how far he was prepared to go.Kershaw 2008, pp 258–259. In support of this, Kershaw cites the example of the massacre of 1,160 Jewish men at Luzk on July 3, 1941, none of whom were Communist Party members, and all of whom were shot for no other reason than, as the "Einsatzkommando" leader reported to Berlin, to prove to the local Jewish community who were the Herrnvolk (master race) and who were not. Protests at Byelaya Tserkov In August 1941, General Walther von Reichenau, the commander of the 6th Army ordered his men to assist the Einsatzgruppen and its Ukrainian auxiliaries with killing the Jews of Byelaya Tserkov. Over the course of the following days, virtually the entire adult Jewish population of Byelaya Tserkov was shot, and all that remained were the children together with a few of the women who were dumped off at a school to await their time of execution.Bergen, Doris "Between God and Hitler" page 124. As the task of shooting the children was considered to be psychologically difficult, none of the Germans present were willing to shoot the children, so the job was assigned to the Ukrainians. It took several days for the SS to recruit enough Ukrainians to shoot the children with promises of extra pay and free vodka. In the interval, several soldiers present at Byelaya Tserkov were disturbed by the crying of the children and infants at the school, and asked their chaplains for advice about what to do. The two chaplains attached to the 295th Infantry Division, the Catholic Father Ernst Tewes and the Lutheran Pastor Gerhard Wilczek visited the school, and were appalled by the condition of the frightened, hungry children. The chaplains then asked the local Army commander to free the children, but that effort failed when as Father Tewes later reported, when he "turned out to be a convinced anti-Semitic".Bergen, Doris "Between God and Hitler" page 125. Joined by two other chaplains from the 295th Division, a series of protest letters were sent to all in positions of authority asking that the children of Byelaya Tserkov be spared. Using their powers of persuasion, the chaplains' won over a staff officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Groscurth to their cause, who ordered a postponement of the planned massacre of the children. In areas near the front, the Einsatzgruppen were under Army command, so when Colonel Groscurth ordered the planned massacre to be put on hold, the local Einsatzkommando leader had no choice, but to comply. Ultimately, General von Reichenau himself intervened to order the executions to go ahead. Reichenau was enraged after receiving a protest letter from two of the chaplains' and wrote in response: The conclusion of the report in question contains the following sentence, "In the case in question, measures against women and children were undertaken which in no way differ from atrocities carried out by the enemy about which the troops are continually being informed". I have to describe this assessment as incorrect, inappropriate and impertinent in the extreme. Moreover this comment was written in an open communication which passes through many hands. It would have been far better if the report had not been written at all.Klee/Dressen/Riess 1991, p 153. Father Tewes later recalled about his efforts at Byelaya Tserkov that: "All those we wanted to save were shot. Because of our initiative it just happened a few days later than planned". One SS man who saw the killings of the children at Byelaya Tserkov on 21 August 1941 described them as follows: The protests at Byelaya Tserkov were unique as being the only time during the entire war that Wehrmacht chaplains tried to prevent an Einsatzgruppen massacre. The American historian Doris Bergen wrote that all of the four chaplains involved in the protest were well aware of the killings of Jewish adults, and seemed only moved to try to stop the killings when they learned that it was children were to be shot. Bergen further observed the "terrible irony" that a gesture of protest further served the genocidal aims of the regime; the soldiers who were troubled by the crying of the children waiting for their time to die felt that they had "dealt with" this issue by "doing something", namely appealing to Father Tewes and Pastor Wilczek, and that they had no further role to play in this matter.Bergen, Doris "Between God and Hilter" page 127. Baltic states As the Einsatzgruppen advanced into the Soviet Union after July 1941, accompanied by Einsatzkommando sub-groups, they transitioned from encouraging pogroms into directly carrying out mass murders of local Jews.Rees 1997, pp 194–197. This started with the shooting of Jewish men, but as the summer wore on, Jews were shot regardless of age or sex. The killing of Jewish children appeared with increasing frequency in Einsatzgruppen reports after August 15, 1941.Rees 1997, p 194. The most murderous group was Einsatzgruppe A, which operated in the formerly Soviet-occupied Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. According to its own reports to Himmler, Einsatzgruppe A killed almost 140,000 people in the five months following the invasion: 136,421 Jews, 1,064 Communists, 653 people with mental illnesses, 56 partisans, 44 Poles, five Gypsies and one Armenian were reported killed between June 22 and November 25, 1941.Hillgruber 1989, p 98. Later, on November 30, 1941, Einsatzgruppe A reported killing 10,600 Jews from Riga in a single day.Hillgruber 1989, p 100. Indeed, Einsatzgruppe A was the first Einsatzgruppe that attempted to systematically exterminate all Jews in its area.Rees 1997, p 182. As Einsatzgruppe A advanced into Lithuania, it actively recruited local nationalists and anti-Semitic groups. In July 1941, members of the Baltaraisciai movement joined the massacres. A pogrom in Riga, Latvia in early July killed 400 Jews. Latvian nationalist Viktors Arājs and his supporters "heated up" the Riga pogrom with a campaign of arson against synagogues.Haberer 2001, pp 68–69. On July 2, Einsatzgruppe A commander Franz Walter Stahlecker appointed Arājs to head the Arajs Kommando, a Sonderkommando (special commando) of about 300 men, mostly university students. Together, Einsatzgruppe A and the Arājs Kommando killed 2,300 Jews in Riga on July 6–7. Within six months, Arājs and his men would kill about half of Latvia's Jewish population.Haberer 2001, p 69. Local officials, the Selbstschutz, and the ''Hilfspolizei'' played a key role in rounding up and massacring Jewish Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians.Haberer 2001, p 71. These groups helped the Einsatzgruppen and other killing units to identify and find Jews in a very short period of time. The Hilfspolizei were auxiliary police organized by the Germans and recruited from former Latvian Army and police officers, ex-''Aizsargi, members of the Pērkonkrusts, and university students. Their task was to assist with the murder of Latvia's Jewish citizens. Similar units were created across Latvia and elsewhere, and provided much of the manpower for the Holocaust in Eastern Europe.Haberer 2001, pp 69–70. The creation of units such as the ''Arājs Kommando, the Rollkommando Hamann in Lithuania and the Omakaitse militia in EstoniaHaberer 2001, p 70. marked an important change in the massacre of Jews in occupied territories: attacks changed from the spontaneous mob violence of the pogroms to more systematic massacres. With extensive local help, Einsatzgruppe A carried out the first "total extermination programme" of the Shoah. Latvian historian Modris Eksteins wrote: Over the course of late 1941, the Einsatzkommandos settled into headquarters in Kovno, Riga and Tallinn. Einsatzgruppe A grew less mobile and faced problems because of its small size. The Germans relied increasingly on the Arājs Kommando and similar groups to perform massacres of Jews. Such extensive and enthusiastic collaboration with the Einsatzgruppen has been attributed to several factors. Since the Russian Revolution of 1905, the Kresy Wschodnie and other border lands had experienced a political culture of violence.Haberer 2001, p 73. The period of Soviet rule was profoundly traumatic for most people in the Baltic states and lands that had belonged to Poland until 1939; the population was brutalized and terrorized by the unwanted imposition of Soviet rule, and the existing, familiar structures of society were utterly destroyed.Haberer 2001, pp 74–75. Historian Erich Haberer notes that many survived and made sense of the "totalitarian atomization" of society by seeking conformity with Communism.Haberer 2001, p 76. As a result, by the time of the German invasion in 1941, many had come to see conformity with a totalitarian regime as socially acceptable behaviour; thus, people simply transferred their conformity to the German regime when it arrived. Some formerly Soviet collaborators sought to divert attention from themselves by naming Jews as collaborators, and killing them.Haberer 2001, p 77. It was widely believed that Jews had collaborated more with the Soviets, although this was not the case.Haberer 2001, pp 75–77. Indeed, Jews were used as scapegoats for many problems around this time. The interwar period had sharpened ethnic antagonism rather than diminishing it,Haberer 2001, p 74. and insecurities about nationalism were often colored with anti-Semitism. The imposition of Soviet rule had been seen as a national humiliation; society was broken up and atomized. Violent acts of national "self-purification" and "redemption" took the form of killing Jews.Haberer 2001, pp 76–77. The German invasion and its accompanying Jewish massacres provided a venue for this fermenting anti-Semitism. Debate The expansion of the range of killings after August 1941 has been the subject of much historical debate. Those historians who take an intentionlist line like Andreas Hillgruber argue that everything that happened after Operation Barbarossa was part of a masterplan he credited Hitler with developing in the 1920s. Hillgruber wrote in his 1967 book Germany and the Two World Wars that for Hitler: The German historian Helmut Krausnick argued that: Streim wrote in response that Krausnick had been taken in by the line invented after the war to reduce the responsibility of the Einsatzgruppen leaders brought to trial.Streim 1989, pp 439–440. Klaus Hildebrand wrote that: Against the intentionalist interpretation, functionalist historians like Martin Broszat argued that the lower officials of the Nazi state had started exterminating people on their own initiative.Broszat 1985, pp 399–404. Broszat argued that the Holocaust began “bit by bit” as German officials stumbled into genocide.Marrus 2000, p 41. Broszat argued that in the fall of 1941 German officials had began "improvised" killing schemes as the "simplest" solution to the "Jewish Question".Broszat 1985, p 408. In Broszat's opinion, Hitler subsequently approved of the measures initiated by the lower officials and allowed the expansion of the Holocaust from Eastern Europe to all of Europe.Broszat 1985, pp 408–413. In this way, Broszat argued that the Shoah was not begun in response to an order, written or unwritten, from Hitler but was rather “a way out of the blind alley into which the Nazis had manoeuvred themselves”. The American historian Christopher Browning has argued that: By contrast, the Swiss historian Philippe Burrin argues that such a decision was not made before August 1941 at the earliest, pointing to orders given by Himmler on July 30, 1941 to the 2nd SS Cavalry Regiment and the SS Cavalry Brigade operating in the Pripet Marshes in the Pripyat operation calling for the murder of male Jews only while the Jewish women and children were to be driven into the Marshes.Rees 1997, p 195. Browning argues that sometime in mid-July 1941 Hitler made the decision to begin general genocide owing to his exhilaration over his victories over the Red Army, whereas Burrin contends that the decision was made in late August 1941 owing to Hitler's frustration over the slowing down of the Wehrmacht. Kershaw argues that the dramatic expansion in both the range of victims and the intensity of the killings after mid-August 1941 indicates that Hitler issued an order to that effect, most probably a verbal order conveyed to the Einsatzgruppen commanders through either Himmler or Heydrich.Kershaw 2008, p 259. It remains unclear whether that was a decision made on Hitler's own initiative motivated only by his own anti-Semitic prejudices, or (impressed with the willingness and ability of Einsatzgruppe A to murder Jewish women and children) ordered that the other three Einsatzgruppen emulate Einsatzgruppe A's bloody example. The Canadian historian Erich Haberer has contended that the “Baltic flashpoint of genocide”, as the killings committed by Einsatzgruppe A between July–October 1941 are known to historians, were the key development in the evolution of Nazi anti-Semitic policy that resulted in the Holocaust.Haberer 2001, p 65. The Baltic area witnessed both the most extensive and intense killings of all the Einsatzgruppen with 90,000–100,000 Jews killed between July and October 1941, which led to the almost total decimation of the Jewish communities in that area. Haberer maintains that the “Baltic flashpoint of genocide” occurred at time when the other Nazi plans for a “territorial final solution” such as the Madagascar Plan were unlikely to occur, and thus suggested to the Nazi leadership that genocide was indeed “feasible” as a “final solution to the Jewish Question”. Wehrmacht All of these killings took place with the knowledge, approval and support of the German Army in the east.Hillgruber 1989, p 102. On October 10, 1941 Field Marshal Walther von Reichenau drafted an order to be read to the German Sixth Army on the Eastern Front. Now known as the Severity Order, it read in part: Upon hearing of Reichenau's Severity Order, Gerd von Rundstedt of Army Group South expressed his "complete agreement" with it, and sent out a circular to all of the Army generals under his command urging them to send out their own versions, impressing upon their troops the need to exterminate Jews.Mayer, Arno J. Why Did The Heavens Not Darken?, New York: Pantheon, 1988, 1990 p 250. General Erich von Manstein, in an order to his troops on November 20, stated: Manstein's only wartime complaint about the actions of the Einsatzgruppen occurred in a 1941 letter to Einsatzgruppen D commanding officer Otto Ohlendorf; since his soldiers were so helpful in assisting Ohlendorf's men to murder Jews, Manstein said, it was unfair that the SS insisted upon keeping all of the murdered Jews' wristwatches for themselves instead of sharing with the Army.Smelser, Ronald & Davies, Edward. The Myth of the Eastern Front, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008 p 43. Beyond this trivial complaint, the Army and the Einsatzgruppen worked closely and effectively. On July 6, 1941 Einsatzkommando 4b of Einsatzgruppe C reported from Tarnopol that "Armed forces surprisingly welcome hostility against the Jews".Hilberg 1985, p 301. On September 8, Einsatzgruppe D reported that relations with the German Army were "excellent". In the same month, Franz Walter Stahlecker of Einsatzgruppe A wrote that Army Group North had been exemplary in co-operating with his men to murder Jews and that relations with the Fourth Panzer Army commanded by General Erich Hoepner were "very close, almost cordial". In the extreme south, the Romanian Army worked closely with Einsatzgruppe D toward the massacre of Ukrainian Jews;Marrus 2000, p 64. the Romanian Army killed around 26,000 Jews in the Odessa massacre.Marrus 2000, p 79. Moreover, most people on the home front in Germany had some idea of the massacres being committed by the Einsatzgruppen.Marrus 2000, p 88. The Einsatzgruppen massacres were usually justified under the grounds of anti-partisan operations rather than racist attacks, but the historian Andreas Hillgruber wrote that this claim was just an "excuse" for the Wehrmacht's considerable involvement with the Einsatzgruppen massacres.Hillgruber 1989, pp 102–103. Hillgruber maintained that the slaughter of about 2.2 million defenceless men, women and children for the reasons of racist ideology cannot possibly be justified, and that those German generals who claimed that the Einsatzgruppen were a necessary anti-partisan response were lying.Hillgruber 1989 p 103. In July 1941, when Joseph Stalin appealed for a partisan war, Hitler privately stated on July 16: "The Russians have now issued an order for a partisan war behind our front. This partisan war has its advantage: it allows us to exterminate all who oppose us." "The Second Sweep" Einsatzgruppe B, C and D'' did not immediately follow ''Einsatzgruppe A's example in systematically killing all Jews in their areas. The Einsatzgruppe commanders, with the exception of Einsatzgruppe A's Stahlecker, were of the opinion by the fall of 1941 that it was impossible to kill the entire Jewish population of the Soviet Union in one sweep, and the killings should stop.Hilberg 1985 p 342. Thus, an interval passed between the "first sweep" of Einsatzgruppen massacres in summer and fall, and what American historian Raul Hilberg called the "second sweep", which started in December 1941 and lasted into the summer of 1942.Hilberg 1985, pp 342–343. During the interval, the surviving Jews were forced into ghettoes. After staging the Babi Yar massacre in September 1941, Einsatzgruppe C reported to Berlin: "Although 75,000 Jews have been liquidated in this manner so far, today it is already clear that even with such tactics a final solution of the Jewish problem will not be possible." In a further report on September 17, Einsatzgruppe C stated: Einsatzgruppe C's advice that the Germans would be better off using Jewish skills and labour rather than shooting them was not taken up. Himmler's appointment book shows that he met with Hitler on 18 December 1941, and in response to Himmer's question "What to do with the Jews of Russia?", Hitler is recorded as responding, "als Partisanen auszurotten" ("exterminate them as partisans").Bauer, Yehuda Rethinking the Holocaust Yale University Press, 2000, p 5. Israeli historian Yehuda Bauer has commented that the remark is probably as close as historians will ever get to a definitive order from Hitler for the genocide carried out during the Holocaust. Bauer added that is unclear whether Himmler's question meant that until that point it had not been decided to exterminate the entire Jewish population, or whether such a decision had already been taken and Himmler's question referred merely to the precise means of extermination. At the time of their meeting, death camps were being constructed under Operation Reinhard, Auschwitz was being converted from a concentration camp to a death camp and Chelmno had already opened earlier that month. Thus, Bauer contends that Himmler's question to Hitler could be about whether to deport Soviet Jews to the death camps or continue the existing policy of genocide under the guise of anti-partisan operations. The "second sweep" started in late December. Einsatzgruppe A had already murdered almost all Jews in its area, and had little else to do, so it shifted its operations into Belorussia to assist Einsatzgruppe B.Hilberg 1985, p 372. In Dnepropetrovsk in February 1942, Einsatzgruppe D reduced the city's Jewish population from 30,000 to 702 over four days. Unlike in Germany, where the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 defined as Jewish anyone with at least three Jewish grandparents, the Einsatzgruppe defined as Jewish anyone with at least one Jewish grandparent; in either case, a person's actual religion was irrelevant.Hilberg 1985, p 368. Reflecting the tendency to justify the massacres as a defensive move forced on the Germans by the danger of Jewish partisan attacks, an SS officer wrote to his wife on September 27, 1941: The same SS officer wrote to his children on October 15, 1942: To help with the "second sweep", the German Order Police and local collaborators provided the extra manpower needed to perform all the shootings.Haberer 2001, p 78. Canadian historian Erich Haberer wrote that, as in the Baltic states, the Germans could not have killed so many Jews so quickly without local help. Haberer points out that the ratio of German Order Police to Schutzmannschaft (Schuma) was 1:10 in both the Reichskommissariat Ukraine and Generalkommissariat Belorussia. In rural areas of Belorussia and Ukraine, the ratio of Order Policeman to Schuma was 1:20, which meant that most Ukrainian and Belorussian Jews were killed by fellow Ukrainians and Belorussians commanded by German officers, rather than Germans themselves. Gebietskommissar Gerhard Erren, an official of the Ministry of the East run by Alfred Rosenberg, wrote about the town of Slonim in a report dated January 25, 1942: Erren's chauffer described one of the "reduction" actions as follows: The Generalkommissar for Belarus, Wilhelm Kube, in a report dated July 31, 1942 wrote: The British historian Hugh Trevor-Roper noted that although photographs of the killings were officially forbidden, it was very common for both the men of the Einsatzgruppen and various by-standers to take pictures of the killings to send to their loved ones, which would suggest widespread approval of the massacres.Trevor-Roper, Hugh "Foreword" to Klee, Dressen and Riess (1991), p xi. Final Solution After a time, it was found that the killing methods used by the Einsatzgruppen were inefficient: they were costly, demoralizing for the troops, and sometimes did not kill the victims quickly enough.Rees 1997, p 197. During a visit to Russia in August 1941, Himmler witnessed the Einsatzgruppen killings first-hand and concluded that shooting Jews was too much of a "psychological burden" for his men. Out of "care and concern" for the Einsatzgruppen, Himmler felt there was a need for a "humane" way of killing—for the killers, that is, not the victims. Himmler ordered the development of gas vans, and these were used by the Einsatzgruppen for mass killings from 1942.Marrus 2000, p 50. Still, such measures were thought not to go far enough. At the Wannsee Conference on 20 January 1942, Reinhard Heydrich and various leading state officials discussed a more sweeping plan for killing Jews in Europe. This ultimately led to the establishment of Vernichtungslagern or extermination camps containing gas-chambers. Under this and other plans, an estimated six million Jews and five million non-Jews would ultimately lose their lives."How many Jews were murdered in the Holocaust?", FAQs about the Holocaust, Yad Vashem. Method of killing used to murder people at Chelmno extermination camp]] Einsatzkommando units typically followed close behind Wehrmacht army formations, marching into cities and towns where large numbers of Jews were known to live. Their task among the advancing troops was to recruit Mannschaft – local assistants such as Junaks (Lithuanian former convicts), Gendarmes (Ukrainian policemen) or Hiwis (local Ukranians); concentrate the hostile and sometimes partisan resistant population; and coordinate and perform executions. Once they entered a town, they issued orders requiring Jews and non-Jewish Communists to assemble for deportation out of town. Those who refused to comply were hunted down. Typically, the gathered people were sent to designated execution sites outside the cities and towns. These massacre sites usually had shallow pits, graves dug in advance (sometimes by forced Jewish laborers) or deep ravines (including one at Babi Yar, near Kiev). Executioners would be waiting, with orders to kill them with machine guns or pistol shots to the head. The killers would also seize the victims' clothing and other belongings; some victims were forced to strip naked just before their execution. Once dead, the victims would be buried with hand shovels or bulldozers. Some victims were only injured, not killed, and were buried alive. A few managed to climb out of the grave and recount this.Martin Gilbert, The Holocaust Some methods and patterns of killing depended on the size of the town: *In big cities, mainly in battle zones, the Nazis would create a small local committee of 8 to 12 important Jews, known as the Judenrat, who would be required to summon the local Jews for "relocation". The Jews (including the Judenrat delegates) were marched to previously prepared trenches or natural pits and shot. Such massacres occurred at Babi Yar and Ponary. *In conquered urban areas of eastern Europe, Einsatzcommando units would first kill many Jews in nearby locations, such as woods or buildings. The remaining Jews would be confined to ghettos. Death rates inside ghettos from disease and malnourishment were high; groups from the ghetto were periodically taken away and shot or deported to extermination camps. Jews in the Lithuanian city of Kaunas were concentrated in the Kovno Ghetto and sent, thousands at a time, to be slaughtered in the town's 7th and 9th forts (watch towers). *In small rural areas, or in battle zones, the Jews were quickly led away and executed in nearby woods and mass graves, often dug by the victims themselves. This happened in the town of Dovno, Ukraine. Occasionally in smaller towns, Jews were locked in abandoned buildings that were set alight or blown up, though this was less common. *In towns across Eastern Europe and in death camps, gas vans were used by the Einsatzgruppe as an alternative to shooting. These vans were used, among other places, by Einsatzgruppe D and Einsatzkommando Kulmhof in the death camp Chelmno. The Jäger Report The Einsatzgruppen kept official records of many of their massacres, and reported to their superiors on their actions. The most notable of these records is the Jäger Report, covering the operation of Einsatzkommando 3 over five months in Lithuania. It is the most precise surviving chronicle of the activities of one individual Einsatzkommando. Written by Einsatzkommando 3 commander Karl Jäger and sent to Franz Walter Stahlecker, it reports an almost daily running total of the liquidations of 137,346 people, the vast majority Jews, from July 2, 1941 to November 25, 1941. The report documents the exact date and place of massacres, number of victims, and their breakdown into categories (Jews, Communists, criminals, etc.). In total, the report lists over 100 executions in 71 different locations. Jäger wrote: "I can confirm today that Einsatzkommando 3 has achieved the goal of solving the Jewish problem in Lithuania. There are no more Jews in Lithuania, apart from working Jews and their families." Jäger escaped capture by the Allies when the war ended, assumed a false identity, and was able to assimilate back into society as an agriculturist until his report was discovered in March 1959. Arrested and charged, Jäger committed suicide in June 1959 in a Hohenasperg prison, awaiting trial for his crimes. Plans for the Middle East An Einsatzgruppe was created in 1942 to kill Jews in the British Mandate of Palestine, according to German historians Klaus-Michael Mallman and Martin Cueppers in a 2006 study. The ''Einsatzgrupppe Ägypten'' was standing by in Athens, Greece, and was prepared to go to Palestine once German forces arrived there, to kill the roughly half a million Jews in the Mandate, after first exterminating the Jews of Egypt. Even more far-reaching were the plans to extend the "Final Solution" to India; in the summer of 1942, the exiled Indian nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose living in Berlin asked Himmler for "special SS training" of Bose's fellow anti-British émigrés so that when the Germans reached India, there would be a cadre of SS-trained Indians to work with the Einsatzgruppen in killing the Jews of India.Mallman, Klaus-Michael & Cueppers, Martin Nazi Palestine, New York: Enigma Books, 2010 page 130. Himmler granted Bose's request, and hundreds of Indian émigrés were enrolled in a RHSA course. SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Walter Rauff was to lead the mobile death squad; its 24 members would enlist collaborators from the local Arab population, so that the "mass murder would continue under German leadership without interruption." Playing promient roles in engaging in anti-Semitic radio propaganda, in preparing to recruit Arab volunteers to assist Einsatzgrupppe Ägypten once it arrived in Egypt, and in raising the Arab-German Battalion that would also follow Einsatzgrupppe Ägypten to the Middle East were the former Iraqi prime minister Rashid Ali al-Gaylani and Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem.Mallman, Klaus-Michael & Cueppers, Martin Nazi Palestine, New York: Enigma Books, 2010 pages 128–130. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, the commander of the Afrika Korps had promised the full co-operation of his corps in assisting Einsatzgrupppe Ägypten in the murder of the Jewish populations of Egypt, Palestine and elsewhere in the Near East. The American historian Gerhard Weinberg commented that Rommel's willingness to work with the SS in killing the Jews of Egypt and Palestine suggested that he was as every bit committed to the "Final Solution" as his counterparts on the Eastern Front, and that his reputation as a chivalrous officer opposed to Nazi crimes is undeserved. The agreement signed in July 1942 that was to govern relations between the Afrika Korps and Einsatzgrupppe Ägypten was almost identical to the agreement signed in May 1941 between Reinhard Heydrich and Eduard Wagner that governed Einsatzgruppen-Wehrmacht relations on the Eastern front, where in exchange for logistical support, Einsatzgrupppe Ägypten was to serve under Wehrmacht command in front-line areas.Mallman, Klaus-Michael & Cueppers, Martin Nazi Palestine, New York: Enigma Books, 2010 page 117. Given its small staff of only 24 men, the Einsatzgrupppe Ägypten would have needed as much help as possible from the local Arabs and from the Afrika Korps to kill the roughly 50,000 Jews of Egypt, to say nothing of the half million or so Jews of the Yishuv. The SS leadership was greatly impressed by the way that the Rollkommando Hamann, a "raiding squad" of Lithuanians commanded by 8 SS officers had killed about 137,346 Jews in 1941–42, and believed that death squads of Palestinians, Egyptians, etc. commanded by German officers might likewise achieve similar results in the Near East.Mallman, Klaus-Michael & Cueppers, Martin Nazi Palestine, New York: Enigma Books, 2010 page 124. The group never left Greece, however; the plans were set aside after the Allied victory at the Battle of El Alamein.Thomas Krumenacker, "Nazis Planned Holocaust for Palestine : historians", Reuters, (April 7, 2006) Disestablishment and post-war By 1942, permanent killing centres at Auschwitz, Sobibor and Treblinka, and other Nazi extermination camps, replaced mobile death squads as the primary method of mass killing. The Einsatzgruppen remained active, however, and were still participating in massacres as late as the fall of 1943. By 1944, the Red Army had begun to push German forces out of Eastern Europe, and the Einsatzgruppen began shutting down activities in order to retreat alongside the regular forces. By late 1944, most Einsatzgruppen personnel had been folded into Waffen-SS combat units or transferred to permanent death camps. Even so, on paper, the SS was still fielding Einsatzgruppen into 1945. SS leaders discussed merging the Einsatzgruppen into the new Werwolf units, designed for guerrilla fighting in occupied Germany; ultimately Werwolf was never an effectual force, either during or after the war. By the fall of Nazi Germany in 1945, there were no longer any active Einsatzgruppen units in operation. At the close of World War II, 24 senior leaders of the Einsatzgruppen were prosecuted in the Einsatzgruppen Trial, part of the Subsequent Nuremberg Trials held under United States military authority, variously charged with crimes against humanity, war crimes, and membership in the SS (which had been declared a criminal organization). Fourteen death sentences and five life sentences were among the judgments; only four executions were carried out, on June 7, 1951; the rest were commuted. Many SS and Police Leaders who had overseen activities in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union simply disappeared, were executed for war crimes, or committed suicide prior to their capture. As for the lower ranking members, a large number of them were killed in combat, captured in combat and executed (on the Eastern Front) or imprisoned in Russian camps, where they ultimately died. The lower ranking members who returned to Germany or to other countries were not formally charged (due to their large numbers) and simply returned to civilian life. Organization (1941) The Einsatzgruppen were deployed as follows: *Einsatzgruppe A (commanded by SS-''Brigadeführer'' Dr. Franz Stahlecker) was assigned to the Baltic area, *Einsatzgruppe B (SS-''Brigadeführer'' Arthur Nebe) to Belarus, *Einsatzgruppe C (SS-''Gruppenführer'' Dr. Otto Rasch) to north and central Ukraine, and * Einsatzgruppe D (SS-''Gruppenführer'' Dr. Otto Ohlendorf) to Moldova, south Ukraine, the Crimea, and, during 1942, the north Caucasus. Of the four Einsatzgruppen, three were commanded by holders of doctorate degrees, of whom one (Rasch) held a double doctorate. See also * Porajmos * Glossary of Nazi Germany * List of Nazi Party leaders and officials * Einsatzkommando Notes References * * * * * * * * * * * ** originally published as * * * * * * ** also available at Mazel library (well indexed HTML version) Further reading * Earl, Hilary, The Nuremberg SS-Einsatzgruppen Trial, 1945–1958: Atrocity, Law, and History, Nipissing University, Ontario ISBN 978-0-521-45608-1 * Krausnick, Helmut, and Wilhelm, Hans-Heinrich: Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges. Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1938–1942. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1981, ISBN 3-421-01987-8 * Stang, Knut: Kollaboration und Massenmord. Die litauische Hilfspolizei, das Rollkommando Hamann und die Ermordung der litauischen Juden. Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main u.a. 1996, ISBN 3-631-30895-7 External links * United States Holocaust Memorial Museum article on Einsatzgruppen * The Einsatzgruppen (einsatzgruppenarchives.com) * "Einsatzgruppen" The Holocaust Education & Archive Research Team Category:Einsatzgruppen Category:Holocaust antisemitic attacks and incidents Category:Military units and formations of Germany Category:The Holocaust in Ukraine Category:The Holocaust in Latvia Category:The Holocaust in Lithuania Category:The Holocaust in Estonia Category:The Holocaust in Russia Category:The Holocaust in Belarus Category:The Holocaust in Poland Category:Holocaust terminology Category:German words and phrases Category:Gestapo ar:أينزاتسغروبن bg:Айнзацгрупи br:Einsatzgruppen ca:Einsatzgruppen cs:Einsatzgruppen da:Einsatzgruppen de:Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD et:Einsatzgruppe A el:Einsatzgruppen es:Einsatzgruppen eo:Einsatzgruppen fr:Einsatzgruppen it:Einsatzgruppen he:איינזצגרופן lt:Einsatzgruppen hu:Einsatzgruppe nl:Einsatzgruppen ja:アインザッツグルッペン no:Einsatzgruppen pl:Einsatzgruppen pt:Einsatzgruppen ro:Einsatzgruppe ru:Айнзатцгруппы полиции безопасности и СД simple:Einsatzgruppen sk:Einsatzgruppen sr:Ајнзацгрупе fi:Einsatzgruppen sv:Einsatzgruppen tr:Einsatzgruppen uk:Айнзатцгрупи vi:Einsatzgruppen zh:别动队 (党卫队)